Luis de Guindos: Interview with Expansión

31 May 2026

After eight years in office, with no let-up between the pandemic, wars, the inflation shock and now the tension in the Middle East, what’s your assessment of your time as Vice-President of the European Central Bank?

I have two main impressions. The first is that time flies. The second is that when you look at everything that has happened, you realise that the world today is very different from what it was eight years ago.

The major change is that geopolitical risk now plays a much more prominent role, and this is reflected in all economic policy decisions. We have experienced a pandemic, the reopening of the economy, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, an increase in inflation and the arrival of a new US Administration, marking a paradigm shift in international relations. The world has completely changed.

With your departure from the Executive Board, Spain will temporarily be left without a seat. Do you think that the weak Government or the corruption cases may affect the process to keep it?

Spain is the euro area’s fourth largest economy and its presence on the ECB’s Executive Board is both essential and fully justified. Its banking system has been cleaned up, and it has shown how the reforms implemented just over a decade ago enable an economy to grow almost twice as fast as the European average. Over and above specific political developments, these circumstances should have a role to play. Spain is likely to have strong candidates, and I am confident it will be able to recover a seat on the Executive Board in the coming quarters when the mandates of various current members come to an end.

Should Spain set its sights on the presidency?

If the opportunity to go for the presidency arises, all the better – but I wouldn’t speculate. The important thing is to be represented on the Executive Board.

It seems that you’ll be moving into academia once you leave office.

I will take up a professorship at Comillas University and work with IESE Business School. It is a very interesting role that will allow me to stay up to date by analysing reports and trends.

And you’re not thinking about a return to politics, as recently rumoured?

I am not considering a return to politics. I was Minister of the Economy for six and a half years and my vanity in that respect has been more than satisfied [laughing].

You won’t be able to vote at the June Governing Council meeting, but if you were still in Frankfurt, where would you stand on interest rates?

I am not going to take a position, but in my view, we are facing a global supply shock that will be reflected first in inflation and then in growth. This shock goes beyond energy and affects other goods as well, worsening the deterioration in the terms of trade. This will have a particularly pronounced impact on economic growth through both consumption and investment. And that will ultimately temper the initial impact of rising energy prices on inflation.

There will be a clear impact on economic growth, and it could even be greater than that caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which was somewhat more regionally contained. The Governing Council will take all of this into account when making its decision, as this situation presents a dilemma for central banks. Also, in June the Governing Council will have new macroeconomic projections and more information on the conflict, which is the great unknown.

If there is a rate hike, normally it doesn’t stop there – it tends to be followed by a second increase. Do you think this is a valid assumption?

I would not be so categorical. The ECB follows a meeting-by-meeting approach and takes decisions based on the data. There is no predetermined decision for June. But even assuming there was, the further step you mention – taking an additional rate increase as a given – is even more uncertain. Everything will depend on the data and the projections.

In Governing Council meetings, do you sense a fear of moving too quickly in raising rates, like in 2011, or of acting too late, like in 2021?

No. 2011 is long behind us, and the circumstances are not comparable, mainly because the fiscal and banking situation of many European economies and the euro area’s governance structure itself were very different at the time.

As for 2021, the situation was also different, albeit for different reasons. There were successive shocks during that period: the pandemic, the bottlenecks that emerged after economies reopened, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and some extremely expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. The public deficit in the euro area reached 7%; the ECB injected €2 trillion of liquidity into the banking sector and purchased another €2 trillion of debt through the pandemic emergency purchase programme. Interest rates were also in negative territory, unlike today.

With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said that we were somewhat late to act in 2021, as were other central banks. But the situation today is completely different. We are now facing a supply shock, but economic policies are not as expansionary as they were a few years ago.

What advice would you give to your successor at the ECB?

I would just wish Boris the best of luck, because challenges and new developments will arise. He has all the qualities needed to be an excellent Vice-President of the ECB: he is pro-European, he understands central banking and he has been on the Governing Council for a long time.

From the macroeconomic figures, the Spanish economy appears to be doing very well. Is everything really as good as it seems?

The Spanish economy has structural advantages thanks to the reforms implemented 12 years ago as well as a robust financial system. It is competitive and has benefited from tailwinds like the migration-driven population increase, which has supported GDP.

As I have said many times before, I am in favour of immigration. At the same time, we must examine the social costs of such rapid population growth over a short space of time, particularly in housing. A larger population pushes up demand for rental housing, but current regulations in Spain are not helping the supply. This leads to higher prices, which affects young people and the labour market. Furthermore, although Spain’s GDP growth is roughly double that of Europe, its GDP per capita is growing at the same rate as Europe’s. This is largely because productivity per employee is not increasing, and as a result wages are not rising as much as they should.

Are there still concerns on the fiscal front?

The fiscal situation in Spain has been given a boost by a very strong increase in tax revenues and the fact that income tax was not adjusted for inflation. But there has been an increase in structural spending, particularly on pensions and healthcare, that will put pressure on in the future. I think that the extraordinary increase in revenues should have been used to make bigger structural adjustments to the budget.

There is a wave of pressure in Brussels from the banking sector and trade bodies to relax the regulations adopted after the crisis and to focus on simplification to boost competitiveness. What are your thoughts on this?

As we stated in the report on simplification that we submitted to the Commission in December, which was approved by all euro area central banks, the capital framework, reporting and supervision can all be simplified to eliminate duplication or redundancies. However, it would be a mistake to reduce the capital requirements for European banks. These requirements are not restricting the provision of credit to firms and households. Moreover, they underpin banks’ solvency and robustness. In fact, I would even go so far as to say that, at present, the solvency of Europe’s banking sector is one of the few comparative advantages that Europe has over other parts of the world and is something that shouldn’t be wasted in an increasingly competitive world.

In your previous role as a government minister, you were responsible for the infamous de Guindos decrees that triggered a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector. Does Europe need another push like this to encourage banking consolidation?

Consolidation should be driven by the banks themselves. The ECB does not get involved in which specific transactions should occur. Our position is clear: the euro area must be an area where capital and liquidity move freely, and governments should not interfere. Political interference eats away at the credibility of the Single Market message and the savings and investments union.

The role of the ECB in mergers is clear: it must assess the solvency of the institutions involved. And it is the responsibility of the competition authorities to ensure that the merger does not cause harm in that area.

The same countries that have opposed consolidation, such as Germany and Spain, are calling for progress on the banking union.

That’s correct. There is a contradiction at the moment, and that stance is having a negative impact on the credibility of the message about the need to make progress on the banking union and the capital markets union.

Regarding BBVA’s takeover bid for Banco Sabadell, was it a mistake to announce it, knowing that the Government would oppose it?

I don’t get involved in things like that. That is something for private operators to assess. The ECB only analysed the solvency of the entity that would be created as a result of the deal, taking into account the previous solvency position of both institutions. I do not have an opinion either way regarding the outcome of the takeover bid.

Will the Government ever sell its stake in CaixaBank?

It should. During my time as minister, several divestments were carried out, and I believe that is how it should be, but that is really a question for the Government.

The Financial Stability Review you have just presented mentions multiple risks. Which is the main “culprit” that keeps you awake at night?

It is difficult to point to one single risk, because they all need to be analysed together to see how they interact. Compared with six months ago, the main change is the increase in geopolitical risk. I am also concerned about the high market valuations, the lack of fiscal space, and the doubts surrounding private credit and equity and their links to banks.

We must remember that a financial crisis never arises from a single factor. One may act as the trigger, but the others act as amplifiers. That’s why we must analyse all of the risks together.

The ECB is working with banks on the threat of increased cyberattacks that could arise from the use of artificial intelligence. Could what was once the great promise of productivity turn into a nightmare?

There are several facets to artificial intelligence. It can boost productivity, increase potential growth and reduce costs. In that sense, it will produce more winners than losers. But it also has limits. “Frontier” models can increase vulnerability to cyberattacks because they identify system vulnerabilities more quickly and accurately. If they fall into the wrong hands, they pose a risk. The message is that banks, and the ECB itself, should invest more in cybersecurity and be aware that there are tools that can, in one way or another, expose the weaknesses in their operating systems.

Regarding the digital euro, which you have been working on for a few years, what’s the main reason we need it?

There are several reasons. The first would be to have a means of payment that can be used across the entire euro area, benefiting consumers and merchants. The second would be the element of autonomy offered: we do not have a European payment method that can be used to make payments worldwide, because we are heavily dependent on US systems. The digital euro will not eliminate cash or push the private sector out of the payments business. We see the digital euro as public money for digital transactions, which is something that will strengthen economic governance in Europe.

What would you say to Spaniards who fear that, as is sometimes suggested on social media, that the digital euro could be used to control and monitor their money?

These are conspiracy theories that I don’t believe in. The ECB’s only motivation in developing the digital euro is to offer an additional and efficient means of payment, which will be free of charge for consumers and cheaper for merchants, especially the smallest ones, compared with payments made using international cards.